In the past, many phenomena, such as lightning, earthquakes, eclipses and comets, were attributed to the supernatural intervention of God. In fact, even today certain calamitous events are referred to in legalese as “acts of God“.
But science has found explanations for all of the aforementioned phenomena in natural processes, and as a result, many have become reluctant to attribute anything to the miraculous, for fear of stifling the progress of science. After all, once a phenomenon is categorized as miraculous, it makes no sense to investigate it further. By its nature (actually, supernature) it frustrates scientific inquiry.
In 1748, David Hume authored an argument against miracles that has become the mainstay of modern academic thought, and that is taught unquestioned in our institutions of higher learning. Hume’s philosophy is largely responsible for many students who enter university with a spiritual foundation to leave it with no belief at all in the supernatural. Although modern science was born in a strongly Christian milieu and avowed Christian scientists such as Newton, Galileo, Copernicus, Pascal, Boyle, Leibniz, Euler, Maxwell, Pasteur and Mendel were largely responsible for its birth and development, scientists today that hold to a belief in God often must veil it if they wish to advance academically.
Hume’s argument goes as follows:
- Laws of nature are, by definition, inviolable rules of natural behavior, attested by large bodies of supporting empirical evidence.
- On the other hand, miracles are, by their very nature, one-time-only events, therefore having only limited supporting empirical evidence.
- The only way to judge between two empirical claims is by the weight and reliability of the evidence.
Therefore, since the laws of nature have near universal evidentiary support, the evidence for the natural will always outweigh the evidence for the miraculous.
Hume said, “Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country.”
It is curious that Hume should choose resurrection as an example upon which to base his case. History records many instances wherein a dead person is claimed to have returned to life. In fact, Christianity is an historical religion, based on the claim that Jesus of Nazareth resurrected. Saying that Christianity is “historical” means that it is dependent on the veracity of the claim that this resurrection actually occurred, and that proof that it did not occur would disprove Christianity altogether [1Cor 15:13-19]. However, the Bible’s authors go to great lengths to provide evidence to validate this claim. Another entire essay would be required to enumerate all the evidence, but let me list a few: Jesus’ death was attested by the thrusting of a spear into Jesus’ side, resulting in the issue of blood and water (bodily fluids had separated, which is a sure sign of death)[Jn 19:34]; The tomb was sealed and a guard was set to prevent mischief (on pain of guards’ death)[Mt 27:62-66]; Jesus appeared to over 500 witnesses, including the disciples/apostles [1Cor 15:3-8]. But the strongest proof to me of Jesus’ resurrection was the fact that the twelve disciples, except for Judas and John, all were eyewitnesses and believed so strongly in it that they chose martyrdom for their beliefs. Today, Christianity remains the #1 religion.
Other Biblical examples of resurrection were Lazarus [Jn 11], Jairus’ daughter [Lk 8:49-56], Zarephath widow’s son [1Ki 17:17-24], and Nain widow’s son {Lk 7:13-15]. Contemporary examples of death-to life experiences abound. Anyone who denies that individuals have died and returned to life is simply ignoring or deliberately denying the huge body of confirming evidence: testimonials by survivors themselves and responsible medical experts, and well-documented instances where the person could not possibly have escaped death. These would all constitute miracles according to Hume’s analysis.
Many natural phenomena contradict Hume’s definition of natural laws, and as such should be rejected as miraculous. For example, the spontaneous generation of the first life form is universally considered to be a one-time event, not one that occurs with regularity; this is a characteristic of a miracle, not a natural law. Furthermore, this supposed one-time event has never been duplicated, even under artificial laboratory conditions, nor has any theory been proposed that adequately explains how it would have occurred. It fits the template of a miracle. Amazingly, many of science’s most firmly held ideas are once-only events, such as the Big Bang and evolution itself. According to Hume’s analysis, such events must have poor empirial support, since they occurred only once, and should be rejected.
But again I ask, if scientists were to admit to the possibility of the miraculous, would not science degenerate, and all unexplained phenomena be called miracles?
I have three comments to make in response to this question.
First, scientists in the past allowed for miracles, and yet science blossomed nonetheless. The father of modern science, Isaac Newton, faced the hard question of whether he could better glorify God by pursuing a career as a cleric or scientist. Although he chose science, his most voluminous literary work was not on gravity, calculus, optics or the laws of motion, but a commentary on the book of Isaiah. In fact, a case can be made that the Christian world view incubated science, since Christian scientists credited the existence and regularity of natural laws to God’s superintendence. Kepler, who formulated the laws of planetary motion, saw himself as a priest “of the highest God” who was merely “thinking God’s thoughts after Him”. These men did not let miracles become an explain-all for every mysterious natural phenomenon; nevertheless, they recognized God’s handiwork in His creation.
Second, attribution of a specific event to the miraculous need not be considered a final analysis. Just as early scientific theories of chemistry, astronomy and atomic theory have evolved, one should not be afraid to characterize an event as a miracle based on the best current evidence, yet allow for future revision if new evidence demands. An example would be abiogenesis, the transition from non-life to the first life. Abiogenesis was once thought to be a simple and explainable phenomenon, but as more experimental evidence has been collected, the answers seem farther from, not closer to, solution. The fact that abiogenesis has not been abandoned as an explanation is more a testament to the stubborn intransigence of the researchers than the weight of the evidence. Pasteur’s law of biogenesis holds more strongly today than it ever has. Note, however, that this is not a one-way street — processes that we do not today characterize as miraculous, such as the functioning of the brain, may demand a supernatural explanation as more is learned.
Third and finally, we have techniques that are used to detect design—and thus a designer—in a wide range of disciplines. For example, in forensics, archaeology and cryptography, the ability to differentiate between natural and intelligent causes is critical. If those techniques are applied to natural phenomena and indicate a certainty of design, there is sometimes no alternative but to attribute the design to a supernatural agent. For example, if analysis indicates that the universe itself is designed, the designer cannot be from within the universe.
In summary, allowing for the possibility of miracles would in no way stifle scientific pursuit. Indeed, science can neither prove nor disprove the possibility of miracles (although it can be used to strengthen or weaken the case for a particular candidate). If miracles do indeed occur, then a science that does not allow for their occurrence cannot discover the truth.